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Abstract
This paper introduces a novel type theory and logic for probabilistic reasoning. Its logic is
quantitative, with fuzzy predicates. It includes normalisation and conditioning of states. This
conditioning uses a key aspect that distinguishes our probabilistic type theory from quantum
type theory, namely the bijective correspondence between predicates and side-effect free actions
(called instrument, or assert, maps). The paper shows how suitable computation rules can be
derived from this predicate-action correspondence, and uses these rules for calculating conditional
probabilities in two well-known examples of Bayesian reasoning in (graphical) models. Our type
theory may thus form the basis for a mechanisation of Bayesian inference.
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1 Introduction
A probabilistic program is understood (semantically) as a stochastic process. A key feature of
probabilistic programs as studied in the 1980s and 1990s is the presence of probabilistic choice,
for instance in the form of a weighted sum x+r y, where the number r ∈ [0, 1] determines
the ratio of the contributions of x and y to the result. This can be expressed explicitly as a
convex sum r · x+ (1− r) · y. Some of the relevant sources are [12, 13], and [11], and [15],
and also [17] for the combination of probability and non-determinism. In the language of
category theory, a probabilistic program is a map in the Kleisli category of the distribution
monad D (in the discrete case) or of the Giry monad G (in the continuous case).
In recent years, with the establishement of Bayesian machine learning as an important area
of computer science, the meaning of probabilistic programming shifted towards conditional
inference. The key feature is no longer probabilistic choice, but normalisation of distributions
(states), see e.g. [3]. Interestingly, this can be done in basically the same underlying models,
where a program still produces a distribution — discrete or continuous — over its output.
This paper contributes to this latest line of work by formulating a novel type theory for
probabilistic and Bayesian reasoning. We list the key features of our type theory.
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2 A Type Theory for Probabilistic and Bayesian Reasoning
It includes a logic, which is quantitative in nature. This means that its predicates are best
understood as ‘fuzzy’ predicates, taking values in the unit interval [0, 1] of probabilities,
instead of in the two-element set {0, 1} of Booleans.
As a result, the predicates of this logic do not form Boolean algebras, but effect modules
(see e.g. [8]). The double negation rule does hold, but the sum > is a partial operation.
Moreover, there is a scalar multiplication s · p, for a scalar s and a predicate p, which
produces a scaled version of the predicate p.
This logic is a special case of a more general quantum type theory [1]. What we describe
here is the probabilistic subcase of this quantum type theory, which is characterised by a
bijective correspondence between predicates and side-effect free assert maps (see below
for details).
The type theory includes normalisation (and also probabilistic choice). Abstractly,
normalisation means that each non-zero ‘substate’ in the type theory can be turned
into a proper state (like in [9]). This involves, for instance, turning a subdistribution∑
i rixi, where the probabilities ri ∈ [0, 1] satisfy 0 < r ≤ 1 for r
def=
∑
i ri, into a proper
distribution
∑
i
ri
r xi — where, by construction,
∑
i
ri
r = 1.
The type theory also includes conditioning, via the combination of assert maps and
normalisation (from the previous two points). Hence, we can calculate conditional prob-
abilities inside the type theory, via appropriate (derived) computation rules. In contrast,
in the language of [3], probabilistic (graphical) models can be formulated, but actual
computations are done in the underlying mathematical models. Since these computation
are done inside our calculus, our type theory can form the basis for mechanisation.
The type theory that we present is based on a new categorical foundation for quantum
logic, called effectus theory, see [8, 9, 4, 5]1. This theory involves a basic duality between
states and effects (predicates), which is implicitly also present in our type theory. A subclass
of ‘commutative’ effectuses can be defined, forming models for probabilistic computation and
logic. Our type theory corresponds to these commutative effectuses, and will thus be called
COMET, as abbreviation of COMmutative Effectus Theory. This COMET can be seen as
an internal language for commutative effectuses.
A key feature of quantum theory is that observations have a side-effect: measuring a
system disturbs it at the quantum level. In order to perform such measurements, each
quantum predicate comes with an associated ‘measurement’ instrument operation which acts
on the underlying space. Probabilistic theories also have such instruments . . . but they are
side-effect free!
The idea that predicates come with an associated action is familiar in mathematics. For
instance, in a Hilbert space H, a closed subspace P ⊆ H (a predicate) can equivalently be
described as a linear idempotent operator p : H→ H (an action) that has P has image. We
sketch how these predicate-action correspondences also exist in the models that underly our
type theory.
First, in the category Sets of sets and functions, a predicate p on a set X can be identified
with a subset of X, but also with a ‘characteristic’ map p : X → 1 + 1, where 1 + 1 = 2 is
the two-element set. We prefer the latter view. Such a predicate corresponds bijectively to a
1 A general introduction to effectus theory [6] will soon be available.
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‘side-effect free’ instrument instrp : X → X +X, namely to:
instrp(x) =
 inl (x) if p(x) = 1inr (x) if p(x) = 0
Here we write X +X for the sum (coproduct), with left and right coprojections (also called
injections) inl (_) , inr (_) : X → X+X. Notice that this instrument merely makes a left-right
distinction, as described by the predicate, but does not change the state x. It is called
side-effect free because it satisfies ∇ ◦ instrp = id, where ∇ = [id, id] : X + X → X is the
codiagonal. It easy to see that each map f : X → X +X with ∇ ◦ f = id corresponds to a
predicate p : X → 1 + 1, namely to p = (! + !) ◦ f , where ! : X → 1 is the unique map to the
final (singleton, unit) set 1.
Our next example describes the same predicate-action correspondence in a probabilistic
setting. It assumes familiarity with the discrete distribution monad D — see [8] for details,
and also Subsection 5.1 — and with its Kleisli category K`(D). A predicate map p : X → 1+1
in K`(D) is (essentially) a fuzzy predicate p : X → [0, 1], since D(1 + 1) = D(2) ∼= [0, 1].
There is also an associated instrument map instrp : X → X + X in K`(D), given by the
function instrp : X → D(X + X) that sends an element x ∈ X to the distribution (formal
convex combination):
instrp(x) = p(x) · inl (x) + (1− p(x)) · inr (x) .
This instrument makes a left-right distinction, with the weight of the distinction given by the
fuzzy predicate p. Again we have ∇◦ instrp = id, in the Kleisli category, since the instrument
map does not change the state. It is easy to see that we get a bijective correspondence.
These instrument maps instrp : X → X + X can in fact be simplified further into
what we call assert maps. The (partial) map assertp : X → X + 1 can be defined as
assertp = (id + !) ◦ instrp. We say that such a map is side-effect free if there is an inequality
assertp ≤ inl (_), for a suitable order on the homset of partial maps X → X + 1. Given
assert maps for p, and for its orthosupplement (negation) p⊥, we can define the associated
instrument via a partial pairing operation as instrp = «assertp, assertp⊥», see below for details.
The key aspect of a probabilistic model, in contrast to a quantum model, is that there is
a bijective correspondence between:
predicates X → 1 + 1
side-effect free instruments X → X +X — or equivalently, side-effect free assert maps
X → X + 1.
We shall define conditioning via normalisation after assert. More specifically, for a state
ω : X and a predicate p on X we define the conditional state ω|p = cond (ω, p) as:
cond (ω, p) = nrm (assertp(ω)) ,
where nrm (−) describes normalisation (of substates to states). This description occurs, in
semantical form in [9]. Here we formalise it at a type-theoretic level and derive suitable
computation rules from it that allow us to do (exact) conditional inference.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the type theory,
with some key results, without giving all the details and proofs. Section 3 takes two
familiar examples of Bayesian reasoning and formalises them in our type theory COMET.
Subsequently, Section 4 explores the type theory in greater depth, and provides justification
for the computation rules in the examples. Next, Section 5 sketches how our type theory
can be interpreted in set-theoretic and probabilistic models. Appendix A contains a formal
presentation of the type theory COMET.
4 A Type Theory for Probabilistic and Bayesian Reasoning
2 Syntax and Rules of Deduction
We present here the terms and types of COMET. We shall describe the system at a high
level here, giving the intuition behind each construction. The complete list of the rules of
deduction of COMET is given in Appendix A, and the properties that we use are all proved
in Section 4.
2.1 Syntax
Assume we are given a set of type constants C, representing the base data types needed for
each example. (These may typically include for instance bool, nat and real.) Then the
types of COMET are the following.
Type A ::= C | constant type
0 | empty type
1 | unit type
A+B | disjoint union
A⊗B pairs
The terms of COMET are given by the following grammar.
Term t ::= x | variable
∗ | element of unit type
t ⊗ t | pair
let x ⊗ y = t in t | decomposing a pair
¡ t | eliminate element of empty type
inl (t) | inr (t) | elements of a disjoint union
(case t of inl (x) 7→ t | inr (x) 7→ t) | case distinction over union
«s, t» | partial pairing
left (t) | extract element of union
instrλxtt | instrument map
1/n | constant scalar(n ≥ 2)
nrm (t) | normalised substate
s> t partial sum
The variables x and y are bound within s in let x ⊗ y = s in t. The variable x is bound
within s and y within t in case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ t, and x is bound within t in
instrλxt(s). We identify terms up to α-conversion (change of bound variable). We write
t[x := s] for the result of substituting s for x within t, renaming bound variables to avoid
variable capture. We shall write _ for a vacuous bound variable; for example, we write
case r of inl (_) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ t for case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ t when y does not occur
free in s.
We shall also sometimes abbreviate our terms, for example writing instrinl(t) when we
should strictly write instrλxinl(x)(t). Each time, the meaning should be clear from context.
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x : A ∈ Γ(var) Γ ` x : A
(unit) Γ ` ∗ : 1 Γ ` s : A ∆ ` t : B(⊗) Γ,∆ ` s ⊗ t : A⊗B
Γ ` s : A⊗B ∆, x : A, y : B ` t : C(lett) Γ,∆ ` let x ⊗ y = s in t : C
Γ ` t : 0(magic) Γ ` ¡ t : A
Γ ` t : A(inl)
Γ ` inl (t) : A+B
Γ ` t : B(inr)
Γ ` inr (t) : A+B
Γ ` r : A+B ∆, x : A ` s : C ∆, y : B ` t : C(case)
Γ,∆ ` case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ t : C
Γ ` s : A+ 1 Γ ` t : B + 1 Γ ` s ↓= t ↑: 2(inlr) Γ ` «s, t» : A+B
Γ ` t : A+B Γ ` inl? (t) = > : 2
(left)
Γ ` left (t) : A
x : A ` t : n Γ ` s : A(instr)
Γ ` instrλxt(s) : n ·A
(1/n)
Γ ` 1/n : 2
` t : A+ 1 ` 1/n ≤ t : 2
(nrm)
Γ ` nrm (t) : A
Γ ` s : A+ 1 Γ ` t : A+ 1
Γ ` b : (A+A) + 1 Γ ` do x← b;B1(x) = s : A+ 1
Γ ` do x← b;B2(x) = t : A+ 1
(>) Γ ` s> t : A+ 1
Figure 1 Typing rules for COMET
Γ ` s : A+ 1 Γ ` t : A+ 1
Γ ` b : (A+A) + 1 Γ ` do x← b;B1(x) = s : A+ 1
Γ ` do x← b; return ∇(x) = t : A+ 1
(order) Γ ` s ≤ t : A+ 1
Figure 2 Rule for Ordering in COMET
The typing rules for these terms are given in Figure 1. (Note that some of these rules
make use of defined expressions, which will be introduced in the sections below.)
The typing rule for the term ¡ t says that from an inhabitant t : 0 we can produce an
inhabitant ¡ t in any type A. Intuitively, this says ‘If the empty type is inhabited, then every
type is inhabited’, which is vacuously true.
A term of type A is intended to represent a total computation, that always terminates
and returns a value of type A. We can think of a term of type A+ 1 as a partial computation
that may return a value a of type A (by outputting inl (a)) or diverge (by outputting inr (∗)).
The judgement s ≤ t should be understood as: the probability that s returns inl (a) is ≤
the probability that t returns inl (a), for all a. The rule for this ordering relation is given in
Figure 2.
The term «s, t» is understood intuitively as follows. We are given two partial computations
s and t, and we have derived the judgement s↓= t↑, which tells us that exactly one of s and
t converges on any given input. We may then form the computation «s, t» which, given an
6 A Type Theory for Probabilistic and Bayesian Reasoning
let x ⊗ y = r ⊗ s in t = t[x := r, y := s] (β⊗)
case inl (r) of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ t = s[x := r] (β+1)
case inr (r) of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ t = t[y := r] (β+2)
B1(«s, t») = s (βinlr1)
B2(«s, t») = t (βinlr1)
inl (left (t)) = t (βleft)
left (inl (t)) = t (ηleft)
index (instrλxp(t)) = p[x := t] (instr-test)
∇(instrλxp(t)) = t (∇-instr)
if ∇(t) = x then instrλxindex(t)(s) = t[x := s] (ηinstr)
if t : 1 then ∗ = t (η1)
if t : A⊗B then let x ⊗ y = t in x ⊗ y = t (η⊗)
if t : A+B then tcase t of inl (x) 7→ inl (x) | inr (y) 7→ inr (y) = t (η+)
if t : A+B then «B1(t),B2(t)» = t (ηinlr)
if t is well-typed then do _← t; return nrm (t) = t (βnrm)
if t = do _← t; return ρ and 1/n ≤ t, then ρ = nrm (t) (ηnrm)
n · 1/n = > (n · 1/n)
if n · t = > then t = 1/n (divide)
Figure 3 Computation rules for COMET
input x, returns either s(x) or t(x), whichever of the two converges.
For the term left (t): if we have a term t : A + B and we have derived the judgement
inl? (t) = >, then we know that t has the form inl (a) for some term a : A. We denote this
unique term a by left (t).
For the term instrλxt(s): think of the type n as the set {1, . . . , n}. The elements of the
type A + · · · + A consist of n copies of each element a of A, denoted inn1 (a), . . . , innn (a).
Then instrλxt(s) is the object innt[x:=s] (s). It maps s into one of the n copies of A, which one
being determined by the test t.
The term 1/n represents the probability distribution on 2 = {>,⊥} which returns >
with probability 1/n and ⊥ with probability (n− 1)/n. It can be thought of as a coin toss,
with a weighted coin that returns heads with probability 1/n.
For the term nrm (t): the term t : A+ 1 represents a distribution on A+ 1. Let s denote
the probability that t terminates (i.e. returns a term of the form inl (a)), and let ω(a) denote
the probability that t returns a. Then nrm (t) returns a with probability ω(a)/s. Thus,
nrm (t) is the distribution resulting from normalising the subdistribution given by t.
The term s> t is the ‘sum’ of s and t in the following sense. It is defined on a given input
if and only if, for any a, the probability that s and t both return inl (a) is ≤ 1. In this case,
the probability that s> t returns inl (a) is the sum of these two probabilities.
The computation rules that these terms obey are given in Figure 3.
Figures 1 and 3 should be understood simultaneously. So the term «s, t» is well-typed if
and only if we can type s : A+ 1 and t : B + 1 (using the rules in Figure 1), and derive the
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equation s↓= t↑ using the rules in Figure 3.
The full set of rules of deduction for the system is given in Appendix A.
2.2 Linear Type Theory
Note the form of several of the typing rules in Figure 1, including (⊗) and (lett) . These
rules do not allow a variable to be duplicated; in particular, we cannot derive the judgement
x : A ` x ⊗ x : A⊗A. The contraction rule does not hold in our type theory — it is not the
case in general that, if Γ, x : A, y : B ` J , then Γ, z : A ` J [x := z, y := z]. Our theory is
thus similar to a linear type theory (see for example [2]).
The reason is that these judgements do not behave well with respect to substitution. For
example, take the computation x : 2 ` x ⊗ x : 2 ⊗ 2. If we apply this computation to the
scalar 1/2, we presumably wish the result to be > ⊗ > with probability 1/2, and ⊥ ⊗ ⊥ with
probability 1/2. But this is not the semantics for the term ` 1/2 ⊗ 1/2 : 2⊗ 2. This term
assigns probability 1/4 to all four possibilities > ⊗ >, > ⊗ ⊥, ⊥ ⊗ >, > ⊗ >.
2.3 Defined Constructions
We can define the following types and computations from the primitive constructions given
above.
2.3.1 States, Predicates and Scalars
A closed term ` t : A will be called a state of type A, and intuitively it represents a probability
distribution over the elements of A.
A predicate on type A is a proposition of the form x : A ` p : 2. These shall be the
formulas of the logic of COMET (see Section 2.4).
A scalar is a term s such that ` s : 2. The closed terms t such that ` t : 2 are called
scalars, and represent the probabilities or truth values of our system. In our intended semantics
for discrete and continuous probabilities, these denote elements of the real interval [0, 1].
Given a state ` t : A and a predicate x : A ` p : 2, we can find the probability that p is
true when measured on t; this probability is simply the scalar p[x := t].
2.3.2 Coproducts and Copowers
Since we have the coproduct A+B of two types, we can construct the disjoint union of n
types A1 + · · ·+An in the obvious way. We write inn1 (), . . . , innn () for its constructors; thus,
if a : Ai then inni (a) : A1 + · · ·+An. And given t : A1 + · · ·+An, we can eliminate it as:
case t of inn1 (x1) 7→ t1 | · · · | innn (xn) 7→ tn .
We abbreviate this expression as case ni=1 t of inni (xi) 7→ ti.
For the special case where all the types are equal, we write n ·A for the type A+ · · ·+A,
where there are n copies of A. In category theory, this is known as the nth copower of A.
(We include the special cases 0 ·A def= 0 and 1 ·A def= A.)
The codiagonal ∇(t) : A for t : n ·A is defined by
∇(t) = case ni=1 t of inni (x) 7→ x .
This computation extracts the value of type A and discards the information about which of
the n copies it came from.
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We write n for n ·1. Intuitively, this is a finite type with n canonical elements. We denote
these elements by 1, 2, . . . , n:
i
def= inni (∗) : n (1 ≤ i ≤ n) .
For t : n ·A, we define
index (t) = case ni=1t of inni (_) 7→ i : n .
Thus, if t = inni (a), then index (t) extracts the index i and throws away the value a.
We have the left () construction, which extracts a term of type A from a term of type
A+B. We have a similar right () construction, but there is no need to give primitive rules
for this one, as it can be defined in terms of left ():
right (t) def= left (swap (t))
where swap (t) = case t of inl (x) 7→ inr (x) | inr (y) 7→ inl (y).
2.3.3 Partial Functions
We may see a term Γ ` t : A + 1 as denoting a partial function into A, which has some
probability of terminating (returning a value of form inl (s)) and some probability of diverging
(returning inr (∗)). We shall introduce the following notation for dealing with partial functions.
We define:
If Γ ` t : A then Γ ` return t def= inl (t) : A+ 1. This program converges with probability 1.
Γ ` fail def= inr (∗) : A+ 1. This program diverges with probability 1.
If Γ ` s : A+ 1 and ∆, x : A ` t : B + 1 then
Γ,∆ ` do x← s; t def= case s of inl (x) 7→ t | inr (_) 7→ fail.
We introduce the following abbreviation. If f is an expression (such as inl, inr) such that
f(x) is a term, then we write t= f for do x← t; f(x).
The term do x← s; t should be read as the following computation: Run s. If s returns a
value, pass this as input x to the computation t; otherwise, diverge.
These constructions satisfy these computation rules (Lemma 6):
do x← return s; t = t[x := s]
do x← fail; t = fail
do x← r; return x = r
do _← r; fail = fail
do x← r; (do y ← s; t) = do y ← (do x← r; s); t
This construction also allows us to define scalar multiplication. Given a scalar ` s : 2
and a substate ` t : A+ 1, the result of multiplying or scaling t by s is ` do _← s; t : A+ 1.
2.3.3.1 Partial Projections
Recall that n · A has, as objects, n copies of each object a : A, namely inn1 (a), . . . , innn (a).
Given t : n ·A, the partial projection Bni1i2···ik(t) : A+ 1 is the partial computation that:
given an element innir (a), returns a;
given an element innj (a) for j 6= i1, . . . , ik, diverges.
Formally, we define
Bni1i2···ik(t)
def= case ni=1t of inni (x) 7→
{
return x if i = i1, . . . , ik
fail otherwise
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2.3.3.2 Partial Sum
Let Γ ` s, t : A+ 1. If these have disjoint domains (i.e. given any input x, the sum of the
probability that s and t return a is never greater than 1), then we may form the computation
Γ ` s > t, the partial sum of s and t. The probability that this program converges with
output a is the sum of the probability that s returns a, and the probability that t returns a.
The definition is given by the rule (>-def) ; see Section 4.5.
We write n · t for the sum t> · · ·> t with n summands. (We include the special cases
0 · t = fail and 1 · t = t.)
With this operation, the partial functions in A+ 1 form a partial commutative monoid
(PCM) (see Lemma 10).
2.4 Logic
The type 2 = 1 + 1 shall play a special role in this type theory. It is the type of propositions
or predicates, and its objects shall be used as the formulas of our logic.
We define > def= inl (∗) and ⊥ def= inr (∗). We also define the orthosupplement of a predicate
p, which roughly corresponds to negation:
p⊥ def= case p of inl (_) 7→ ⊥ | inr (_) 7→ >
We immediately have that p⊥⊥ = p, >⊥ = ⊥ and ⊥⊥ = >.
The ordering on 2 shall play the role of the derivability relation in our logic: p ≤ q will
indicate that q is derivable from p, or that p implies q. The rules for this logic are not the
familiar rules of classical or intuitionistic logic. Rather, the predicates over any context form
an effect algebra (Proposition 14).
In the case of two predicates p and q, the partial sum can be thought of as the proposition
‘p or q’. However, it differs from disjunction in classical or intuitionistic logic as it is a partial
operation: it is only defined if p ≤ q⊥ (Proposition 14.4). This condition can be thought of
as expressing that s and t are disjoint; that is, they are never both true.
2.4.1 n-tests
An n-test in a context Γ is an n-tuple of predicates (p1, . . . , pn) on A such that
Γ ` p1 > · · ·> pn = > : 2 .
Intutively, this can be thought of as a set of n fuzzy predicates whose probabilities always
sum to 1. We can think of this as a test that can be performed on the types of Γ with n
possible outcomes; and, indeed, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the n-tests of
Γ and the terms of type n (Lemma 26).
2.4.2 Instrument Maps
Let x : A ` t : n and Γ ` s : A. The term instrλxt(s) : n · A is interpreted as follows: we
read the computation x : A ` t : n as a test on the type A, with n possible outcomes. The
computation instrλxt(s) runs t on (the output of) s, and returns either inni (s), where i is the
outcome of the test.
Given an n-test (p1, . . . , pn) on A, we can write a program that tests which of p1, . . . , pn
is true of its input, and performs one of n different calculations as a result. We write this
program as
Γ ` measure p1 7→ t1 | · · · | pn 7→ tn .
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It will be defined in Definition 30.
If x : A ` p : 2 and Γ, x : A ` s, t : A, we define
Γ ` (if p then s else t) = measure p 7→ s | p⊥ 7→ t .
In the case where s and t do not depend on x, we have the following fact (Lemma 32.2):
if p then s else t = case p of inl (_) 7→ s | inr (_) 7→ t
2.4.3 Assert Maps
If x : A ` p : 2 is a predicate, we define
Γ ` assertλxp(t) def= case instrλxp(t) of inl (x) 7→ return x | inr (_) 7→ fail : A+ 1
The computation assertp(t) is a partial computation with output type A. It tests whether p
is true of t; if so, it leaves t unchanged; if not, it diverges. That is, if p[x := t] returns >, the
computation converges and returns t; if not, it diverges.
These constructions satisfy the following computation rules (see Section 4.5.1 below for
the proofs).
(assert↓) (assertλxp(t))↓= p[x := t]
(assert-scalar) For a scalar ` s : 2: assertλ_s(∗) = instrλ_s(∗) = s : 2.
(instr+) For x : A+B ` t : n:
instrλxt(s) = case s of inl (y) 7→ case ni=1instrλa.t[x:=inl(a)](y) of inni (z) 7→ inni (inl (z))
inr (y) 7→ case ni=1instrλb.t[x:=inl(b)](y) of inni (z) 7→ inni (inr (z))
(assert+) For x : A+B ` p : 2:
assertλxp(t) = case t of inl (x) 7→ do z ← assertλa.p[x:=inl(a)](x); return inl (z) |
inr (y) 7→ do z ← assertλb.p[x:=inr(b)](y); return inr (z)
(instr m) For x : m ` t : n:
instrλxt(s) = case mi=1s of i 7→ case nj=1t[x := i] of j 7→ innj (i)
(assert m) For x : m ` p : 2:
assertλxp(t) = case mi=1t of i 7→ if p[x := i] then return i else fail
In particular, we have assertinl?(t) = B1(t) and assertinr?(t) = B2(t).
2.4.4 Sequential Product
Given two predicates x : A ` p, q : 2, we can define their sequential product
x : A ` p & q def= do x← assertp(x); q : 2 .
The probability of this predicate being true at x is the product of the probabilities of p
and q. This operation has many of the familiar properties of conjunction — including
commutativity — but not all: in particular, we do not have p & p⊥ = ⊥ in all cases. (For
example, 1/2 & (1/2)⊥ = 1/4.)
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2.4.5 Coproducts
We can define predicates which, given a term t : A+B, test which of A and B the term came
from. We write these as inl? (t) and inr? (t). (Compare these with the operators FstAnd and
SndAnd defined in [10].) They are defined by
inl? (t) def= case t of inl (_) 7→ > | inr (_) 7→ ⊥
inr? (t) def= case t of inl (_) 7→ ⊥ | inr (_) 7→ >
2.4.6 Kernels
The predicate inr? () is particularly important for partial maps.
Let Γ ` t : A+ 1. The kernel of the map denoted by t is
t↑def= inr? (t) def= case t of inl (_) 7→ ⊥ | inr (_) 7→ >
Intuitively, if we think of t as a partial computation, then t↑ is the proposition ‘t does not
terminate’, or the function that gives the probability that t will diverge on a given input.
Its orthosupplement, (t↑)⊥ = inl? (t), which we shall also write as t↓, is also called the
domain predicate of t, and represents the proposition that t terminates. We note that it is
equal to do _← t;>.
2.4.7 Normalisation
We have a representation of all the rational numbers in our system: let m/n be the term
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
1/n> · · ·> 1/n .
The usual arithmetic of rational numbers (between 0 and 1) can be carried out in our system
(see Section 4.8). In particular, for rational numbers q and r, we have that if q ≤ r then the
judgement q ≤ r is derivable; q > r is well-typed if and only if q + r ≤ 1, in which case q > r
is equal to q + r; and q & r = qr.
Now, let ` t : A+ 1. Then t represents a substate of A. As long as the probability t↓ is
non-zero, we can normalise this program over the probability of non-termination. The result
is the state denoted by nrm (t). Intuitively, the probability that nrm (t) will output a is the
probability that t will output inl (a), conditioned on the event that t terminates.
In order to type nrm (t), we must first prove that t has a non-zero probability of terminating
by deriving an inequality of the form 1/n ≤ t↓ for some positive integer n ≥ 2.
If ` t : A and x : A ` p(x) : 2, we write cond (t, p) for
cond (t, p) def= nrm (assertp(t)) .
The term t denotes a computation whose output is given by a probability distribution over
A. Then cond (t, p) gives the result of normalising that conditional probability distribution
with respect to p.
2.4.8 Marginalisation
The tensor product of type A⊗B comes with two projections. Given Γ ` t : A⊗B, define
Γ ` pi1(t) def= let x ⊗ _ = t in x : A
Γ ` pi2(t) def= let _ ⊗ y = t in y : B
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If t is a state (i..e Γ is the empty context), then pi1(t) denotes the result of marginalising t,
as a probability distribution over A⊗B, to a probability distribution over A.
2.4.9 Local Definition
In our examples, we shall make free use of local definition. This is not a part of the syntax
of COMET itself, but part of our metalanguage. We write let x = s in t for t[x := s]. We
shall also locally define functions: we write let f(x) = s in t for the result of replacing every
subterm of the form f(r) with s[x := r] in t.
3 Examples
This section describes two examples of (Bayesian) reasoning in our type theory COMET.
The first example is a typical exercise in Bayesian probability theory. Since such kind of
reasoning is not very intuitive, a formal calculus is very useful. The second example involves
a simple graphical model.
I Example 1. (See also [18, 3]) Consider the following situation.
1% of a population have a disease. 80% of subjects with the disease test positive, and
9.6% without the disease also test positive. If a subject is positive, what are the odds
they have the disease?
This situation can be described as a very simple graphical model, with associated (conditional)
probabilities.   HasDisease
  PositiveResult
Pr (HD)
0.01
HD Pr (PR)
t 0.8
f 0.096
In our type theory COMET, we use the following description.
let subject = 0.01 in
let positive_result(x) = (if x then 0.8 else 0.096) in
cond (subject, positive_result)
We thus obtain a state subject : 2, conditioned on the predicate positive_result on 2. We
calculate the outcome in semi-formal style. The conditional state cond (subject, positive_result)
is defined via normalisation of assert, see Subsection 2.4.7. We first show what this assert
term is, using the rule (assert m) and (assert-scalar):
assertpositive_result(x) = if x then do _← assertpositive_result(>)(x); return >
else do _← assertpositive_result(⊥)(x); return ⊥
= if x then do _← assert0.8(x); return >
else do _← assert0.096(x); return ⊥
= if x then if 0.8 then return > else fail
else if 0.096 then return ⊥ else fail
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Conditioning requires that the domain of the substate assertpositive_result(subject) is non-zero.
We compute this domain as:
assertpositive_result(subject)↓ = positive_result(subject) (Rule (assert↓))
= if 0.01 then 0.8 else 0.096
= 0.01 & 0.8> 0.99 & 0.096 (Lemma 32.2)
= 0.10304 (Lemma 34)
Hence we can choose (for example) n = 10, to get 1n ≤ 0.10304 = assertpositive_result(subject)↓.
We now proceed to calculate the result, answering the question in the beginning of this
example.
assertpositive_result(subject) = if 0.01 then if 0.8 then return > else fail
else if 0.096 then return ⊥ else fail
= measure 0.01 & 0.8 7→ return >
0.01 & 0.8⊥ 7→ fail
0.01⊥ & 0.096 7→ return ⊥
0.01⊥ & 0.096⊥ 7→ fail
(Lemma 31.3)
= measure 0.008 7→ return >
0.09504 7→ return ⊥
0.89696 7→ fail
(Lemma 31.5)
cond (subject, positive_result) def= nrm (assertpositive_result(subject))
= measure 0.0776 7→ >
0.9224 7→ ⊥
(Corollary 36)
= 0.0776. (Lemma 32.3)
Hence the probability of having the disease after a positive test result is 7.8%.
I Example 2 (Bayesian Network). The following is a standard example of a problem in
Bayesian networks, created by [16, Chap. 14].
I’m at work, neighbor John calls to say my alarm is ringing. Sometimes it’s set off by
minor earthquakes. Is there a burglar?
We are given that the situation is as described by the following Bayesian network. Burglary
$$
 Earthquake
yy  Alarm
zz %%  JohnCalls  MaryCalls
Pr (B)
1
1000
A Pr (J)
t 910
f 120
B E Pr (A)
t t 95100
t f 94100
f t 29100
f f 11000
Pr (E)
1
500
A Pr (M)
t 710
f 1100
The probability of each event given its preconditions is as given in the tables — for example,
the probability that the alarm rings given that there is a burglar but no earthquake is 0.94.
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We model the above question in COMET as follows.
let b = 0.01 in let e = 0.002 in
let a(x, y) = (if x then (if y then 0.95 else 0.94)
else (if y then 0.29 else 0.001)) in
let j(z) = (if z then 0.9 else 0.05) in
let m(z) = (if z then 0.7 else 0.01) in
pi1
(
cond (b ⊗ e, j ◦ a) )
We first elaborate the predicate j ◦ a, given in context as x : 2, y : 2 ` j(a(x, y)) : 2. It is:
j(a(x, y)) = if a(x, y) then 0.90 else 0.05
= if x then (if y then (if 0.95 then 0.90 else 0.05) else (if 0.94 then 0.90 else 0.05)
else (if y then (if 0.29 then 0.90 else 0.05) else (if 0.001 then 0.90 else 0.05)
= if x then (if y then 0.95 & 0.90> 0.95⊥ & 0.05 else 0.94 & 0.90> 0.94⊥ & 0.05)
else (if y then 0.29 & 0.90> 0.29⊥ & 0.05 else 0.001 & 0.90> 0.001⊥ & 0.05
= if x then (if y then 0.8575 else 0.849) else (if y then 0.2965 else 0.05085)
The associated assert map is:
assertj◦a(b, e) = measure 0.001 & 0.002 & 0.8575 7→ return > ⊗ >
0.001 & 0.998 & 0.849 7→ return > ⊗ ⊥
0.999 & 0.002 & 0.2965 7→ return ⊥ ⊗ >
0.999 & 0.998 & 0.05085 7→ return ⊥ ⊗ ⊥
0.052138976⊥ 7→ fail
= measure 0.000001715 7→ return > ⊗ >
0.000847302 7→ return > ⊗ ⊥
0.000592407 7→ return ⊥ ⊗ >
0.050697552 7→ return ⊥ ⊗ ⊥
0.052138976⊥ 7→ fail
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Hence by Corollary 36 we obtain the marginalised conditional:
pi1
(
cond (b ⊗ e, j ◦ a) ) = pi1(nrm (assertj◦a(b, e)) )
= pi1
(
measure 0.000001715/0.052138976 7→ > ⊗ >
0.000847302/0.052138976 7→ > ⊗ ⊥
0.000592407/0.052138976 7→ ⊥ ⊗ >
0.050697552/0.052138976 7→ ⊥ ⊗ ⊥ )
= measure 0.000032893 7→ pi1(> ⊗ >)
0.016250837 7→ pi1(> ⊗ ⊥)
0.011362078 7→ pi1(⊥ ⊗ >)
0.972354194 7→ pi1(⊥ ⊗ ⊥)
= measure 0.000032893 7→ >
0.016250837 7→ >
0.011362076 7→ ⊥
0.972354194 7→ ⊥
= measure 0.01628373 7→ >
0.98371627 7→ ⊥
= 0.01628373
We conclude that there is a 1.6% chance of a burglary when John calls.
4 Metatheorems
We presented an overview of the system in Section 2, and gave the intuitive meaning of the
terms of COMET. In this section, we proceed to a more formal development of the theory,
and investigate what can be proved within the system.
The type theory we have presented enjoys the following standard properties.
I Lemma 3.
1. Weakening If Γ ` J and Γ ⊆ ∆ then ∆ ` J .
2. Substitution If Γ ` t : A and ∆, x : A ` J then Γ,∆ ` J [x := t].
3. Equation Validity If Γ ` s = t : A then Γ ` s : A and Γ ` t : A.
4. Inequality Validity If Γ ` s ≤ t : A+ 1 then Γ ` s : A+ 1 and Γ ` t : A+ 1.
5. Functionality If Γ ` r = s : A and ∆, x : A ` t : B then Γ,∆ ` t[x := r] = t[x := s] : B.
Proof. The proof in each case is by induction on derivations. Each case is straightforward. J
The following lemma shows that substituting within our binding operations works as
desired.
I Lemma 4. 1. If Γ ` r : A ⊗ B; ∆, x : A, y : B ` s : C; and Θ, z : C ` t : D then
Γ,∆,Θ ` t[z := let x ⊗ y = r in s] = let x ⊗ y = r in t[z := s] : D.
2. If Γ ` r : A+B; ∆, x : A ` s : C; ∆, y : B ` s′ : C; and Θ, z : C ` t : D then
Γ,∆,Θ ` t[z := case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ s′]
= case r of inl (x) 7→ t[z := s] | inr (y) 7→ t[z := s′] : D
.
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Proof. For part 1, we us the following ‘trick’ to simulate local definition (see [1]):
t[z := case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ s′]
= let z ⊗ _ = (case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ s′) ⊗ ∗ in t (β⊗)
= let z ⊗ _ = case r of inl (x) 7→ s ⊗ ∗ | inr (y) 7→ s′ ⊗ ∗ in t (case-⊗)
= case r of inl (x) 7→ let z ⊗ _ = s ⊗ ∗ in t | inr (y) 7→ let z ⊗ _ = s′ ⊗ ∗ in t (let-case)
= case r of inl (x) 7→ t[z := s] | inr (y) 7→ t[z := s′] (β⊗)
Part 2 is proven similarly using (let-⊗) and (let-let) . J
I Corollary 5. 1. If Γ ` s : A⊗B and ∆ ` t : C then Γ,∆ ` let _ ⊗ _ = s in t = t : C.
2. If Γ ` s : A+B and ∆ ` t : C then Γ,∆ ` case s of inl (_) 7→ t | inr (_) 7→ t = t : C.
Proof. These are both the special case where z does not occur free in t. J
4.1 Coproducts
We generalise the inl? () and inr? () constructions as follows. Define the predicate ini? () on
n ·A, which tests whether a term comes from the ith component, as follows.
ini? (t) def= case nj=1t of innj (_) 7→
{
> if i = j
⊥ if i 6= j
4.2 The Do Notation
Our construction do x← s; t satisfies the following laws.
I Lemma 6. Let Γ ` r : A+ 1, ∆, x : A ` s : B+ 1, and Θ, y : B ` t : C. Let also Γ ` r′ : A.
Then
Γ,∆ ` do x← return r′; s = t[x := s] : B + 1
Γ,∆ ` do x← fail; s = fail : B + 1
Γ ` do x← r; return x = r : A+ 1
Γ ` do _← r; fail = fail : B + 1
Γ,∆,Θ ` do x← r; (do y ← s; t) = do y ← (do x← r; s); t : C
Proof. These all follow easily from the rules for coproducts (β+1) , (β+2) , (η+) and
(case-case) . J
4.3 Kernels
I Lemma 7.
1. If Γ ` t : A+ 1 then Γ ` t↓= (do _← t;>) : 2
2. Let Γ ` t : A+ 1. Then Γ ` t↓= ⊥ : 2 if and only if Γ ` t = fail : A+ 1.
3. Let Γ ` s : A+ 1 and ∆, x : A ` t : B + 1. Then Γ,∆ ` (do x← s; t)↓= do x← s; t↓ : 2.
Proof.
1. This holds just by expanding definitions.
2. Obviously, (fail↓) = ⊥. For the converse, if t↓= ⊥ then t↑= > and so t = inr (right (t)) =
inr (∗) by (η1) .
3. (case s of inl (x) 7→ t | inr (_) 7→ fail↓) = case s of inl (x) 7→ t↓ | inr (_) 7→ fail↓
= case s of inl (x) 7→ t↓ | inr (_) 7→ ⊥
J
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4.4 Finite Types
I Lemma 8. Let Γ ` t : n and i ≤ n. If Γ ` Bi(t) = > : 2 then Γ ` t = i : n.
Proof. Define x : n ` f(x) : 1 + n− 1 by
f(x) def= case nj=1x of

inr (j) if j < i
inl (∗) if j = i
inr (j − i) if j > i
Then Γ ` inl? (f(t)) = > : 2, hence
f(t) = inl (left (f(t))) = inl (∗)
We can define an inverse to f : given x : 1 + n− 1, define
f−1(x) def= case x of inl (_) 7→ i | inr (t) 7→ case n−1j=1 t of j if j < i | j + 1 if j ≥ i
Then x : n ` f−1(f(x)) = x : 1 + n− 1 and so Γ ` t = f−1(f(t)) = f−1(inl (∗)) = i : n. J
4.5 Ordering on Partial Maps and the Partial Sum
Note that, from the rules (>) and (>-def) , we have Γ ` s > t : A + 1 if and only if there
exists Γ ` b : (A+A) + 1 such that
Γ ` b= B1 = s : A+ 1, Γ ` b= B2 = t : A+ 1 ,
in which case Γ ` s > t = do x ← b; return ∇(x) : A + 1. We say that such a term b is a
bound for s> t. By the rule (JM) , this bound is unique if it exists.
I Lemma 9. For predicates Γ ` p, q : 2, we have that Γ ` b : 3 is a bound for p> q if and
only if B1(b) = p and B2(b) = q.
Proof. This holds because b= B1 = B1(b) and b= B2 = B2(b), as can be seen just from
expanding definitions. J
The set of partial maps A → B + 1 between any two types A and B form a partial
commutative monoid (PCM) with least element fail, as shown by the following results.
I Lemma 10.
1. If Γ ` t : A+ 1 then Γ ` t> fail = t : A+ 1.
2. (Commutativity) If Γ ` s> t : A+ 1 then Γ ` t> s : A+ 1 and Γ ` s> t = t> s : A+ 1.
3. (Associativity) Γ ` (r > s)> t : A+ 1 if and only if Γ ` r > (s> t) : A+ 1, in which
case Γ ` r > (s> t) = (r > s)> t : A+ 1.
Proof. 1. The bound is do x← t; return inl (x).
2. Let b be a bound for s> t. Then do x← b; return swap (x) is a bound for t> s and we
have
t> s = do y ← (do x← b; return swap (x)); return ∇(y)
= do x← b; do y ← return swap (x); return ∇(y)
= do x← b; return ∇(swap (x)) = do x← b; return ∇(x)
= s> t
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3. This is proved in Appendix B
J
I Lemma 11. Let Γ ` r : A + 1 and Γ ` s : A + 1. Then Γ ` r ≤ s : A + 1 if and only if
there exists t such that Γ ` r > t = s : A+ 1.
Proof. Suppose r ≤ s. If b is such that do x← b;B1(x) = r and do x← b; return ∇(x) = s
then take t = do x← b;B2(x).
Conversely, if r > t = s, then inverting the derivation of Γ ` r > t : A+ 1 we have that
there exists b such that r = do x← b;B1(x), t = do x← b;B2(x) and s = r > t = do x←
b; return ∇(x). Therefore, r ≤ s by (order) . J
I Corollary 12. Let Γ ` r : A + 1 and Γ ` s : A + 1. Then Γ ` r ≤ s : A + 1 if and
only if there exists b such that Γ ` b : (A + A) + 1, Γ ` b = B1 = s : A + 1, and
Γ ` do x← b; return ∇(x) = s : A+ 1.
This term b is called a bound for s ≤ t.
Using this characterisation of the ordering relation, we can read off several properties
directly from Lemma 10.
I Lemma 13. 1. If Γ ` s> t : A+ 1 then Γ ` s ≤ s> t : A+ 1 and Γ ` t ≤ s> t : A+ 1.
2. If Γ ` t : A+ 1 then Γ ` t ≤ t : A+ 1.
3. If Γ ` t : A+ 1 then Γ ` fail ≤ t : A+ 1.
4. If Γ ` r ≤ s : A+ 1 and Γ ` s ≤ t : A+ 1 then Γ ` r ≤ t : A+ 1.
5. If Γ ` r ≤ s : A+ 1 and Γ ` s> t : A+ 1 then Γ ` r > t ≤ s> t : A+ 1.
Proof. 1. From Lemma 11 and Commutativity.
2. From Lemma 11 and Lemma 10.1.
3. From Lemma 11 and Lemma 10.1.
4. From Lemma 11 and Associativity.
5. Let r > x = s. Then r > x> t = s> t and so r > t ≤ s> t.
J
On the predicates, we have the following structure, which shows that they form an effect
algebra. (In fact, they have more structure: they form an effect module over the scalars, as
we will prove in Proposition 25.)
I Proposition 14. Let Γ ` p, q, r : 2.
1. If Γ ` p : 2 then Γ ` p> p⊥ = > : 2.
2. If Γ ` p> q = > : 2 then Γ ` q = p⊥ : 2.
3. (Zero-One Law) If Γ ` p>> : 2 then Γ ` p = ⊥ : 2.
4. Γ ` p> q : 2 if and only if Γ ` p ≤ q⊥ : 2.
Proof. 1. The term inl (p) : 2+ 1 is a bound for p> p⊥, and do x← inl (p); return ∇(x) = >.
2. Let b be a bound for p> q. We have
> = do x← b; return ∇(x) = do x← b;> using (η1)
= b↓
Therefore, b = inl (left (b)) by (βleft) , and so
p = B1(left (b)), q = B2(left (b)) = B1(left (b))⊥ = p⊥
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3. Let b be a bound for p>>. Then B2(b) = > and so b = 2 : 3 by Lemma 8. Therefore,
p = B1(b) = ⊥.
4. Suppose p> q : 2. Then p> q> (p> q)⊥ = >, hence p> (p> q)⊥ = q⊥, and thus p ≤ q⊥.
Conversely, if p ≤ q⊥, let p> x = q⊥. Then > = q > q⊥ = p> q > x, and so p> q : 2.
J
I Corollary 15. 1. (Cancellation) If Γ ` p> q = p> r : 2 then Γ ` q = r : 2.
2. (Positivity) If Γ ` p> q = ⊥ : 2 then Γ ` p = ⊥ : 2 and Γ ` q = ⊥ : 2.
3. If Γ ` p : 2 then Γ ` p ≤ > : 2.
4. If Γ ` p ≤ q : 2 then Γ ` q⊥ ≤ p⊥ : 2.
Proof. 1. We have
p> q > (p> q)⊥ = p> r > (p> q)⊥ = >
∴ q = r = (p> (p> q)⊥)⊥
2. If p> q = ⊥ then p> q >> : 2, hence p>> : 2 by Associativity, and so p = ⊥ by the
Zero-One Law.
3. We have p> p⊥ = > and so p ≤ >.
4. Let p> x = q. Then > = q > q⊥ = p> x> q⊥, and so p⊥ = x> q⊥. Thus, q⊥ ≤ p⊥.
J
Our next lemma shows how > and case interact.
I Lemma 16. Suppose Γ ` r : A+B and ∆, x : A ` s>t : C+1 and ∆, y : B ` s′>t′ : C+1.
Then
Γ,∆ ` case r of inl (x) 7→ s> t | inr (y) 7→ s′ > t′
= (case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ s′)> (case r of inl (x) 7→ t | inr (y) 7→ t′) : C + 1
Proof. Let b(x) be a bound for s > t in ∆, x : A, and c(y) a bound for s′ > t′ in ∆, y : B.
Then
case r of inl (x) 7→ b(x) | inr (y) 7→ c(y) : (B +B) + 1
is a bound for (case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ s′)> (case r of inl (x) 7→ t | inr (y) 7→ t′), and
so
(case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ s′)> (case r of inl (x) 7→ t | inr (y) 7→ t′)
= do z ← case r of inl (x) 7→ b(x) | inr (y) 7→ c(y); return ∇(z)
= case r of inl (x) 7→ do z ← b(x); return ∇(z) | inr (y) 7→ do z ← c(y); return ∇(z)
= case r of inl (x) 7→ s> t | inr (y) 7→ s′ > t′
J
I Corollary 17. If Γ ` r : A+ 1 and ∆, x : A ` s> t : B + 1 then
Γ,∆ ` do x← r; s> t = (do x← r; s)> (do x← r; t) : B + 1 .
Proof.
do x← r; s> t =case r of inl (x) 7→ s> t | inr (_) 7→ fail> fail
=(case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (_) 7→ fail)>
(case r of inl (x) 7→ t | inr (_) 7→ fail)
J
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The following lemma relates the structures on partial maps and predicates via the domain
operator.
I Lemma 18. If Γ ` s> t : A+ 1 then Γ ` (s> t)↓= s↓ >t↓: 2.
Proof. Let b be a bound for s> t. Then
(s> t)↓= (do x← b; return ∇(x))↓= do x← b;> = b↓
We also have
s↓ = do x← b; inl? (x), t↓= do x← b; inr? (x)
∴ s↓ >t↓ = do x← b; inl? (x)> inr? (x) (previous part)
= (do x← b;>) = b↓
J
Using this, we can conclude several properties about partial maps immediately from the
fact that they hold for predicates:
I Lemma 19. 1. (Restricted Cancellation Law) If Γ ` s> t = t : A+ 1 then Γ ` s =
fail : A+ 1.
2. (Positivity) If Γ ` s> t = fail : A+ 1 then Γ ` s = fail : A+ 1 and Γ ` t = fail : A+ 1.
3. If Γ ` s ≤ t : A+ 1 and Γ ` t ≤ s : A+ 1 then Γ ` s = t : A+ 1.
Proof. 1. Suppose Γ ` s > t = t : A + 1. Then Γ ` (s> t) ↓= s ↓ >t ↓= t ↓: 2, and so
Γ ` s↓= ⊥ : 2 and Γ ` s = fail : A+ 1 by Lemma 7.2.
2. Suppose Γ ` s > t = fail. Then (s> t) ↓= s ↓ >t ↓= ⊥, and so s ↓= ⊥ and t ↓= ⊥.
Therefore, s = fail and t = fail by Lemma 7.2.
3. Let s > b = t and t > c = s. Then s > b > c = s and so b > c = fail by the Restricted
Cancellation Law, hence b = c = fail by Positivity. Thus, s = s> fail = t.
J
Finally, we can show that the partial projections on copowers behave as expected with
respect to >.
I Lemma 20. For t : n ·A,
Bi1,...,ik(t) = Bi1(t)> · · ·>Bik(t)
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. Take
b = case ni=1t of inni (_) 7→

1 if i = i1, . . . , ik
2 if i = ik+1
3 otherwise
Then B1(b) = Bi1···ik(t), B2(b) = Bik+1(t), and B12(b) = Bi1···ikik+1(t). Therefore,
Bi1i2···ik+1(t) = Bi1···ik(t)>Bik+1(t) = Bi1(t)> · · ·>Bik+1(t)
by the induction hypothesis. J
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4.5.1 Assert Maps
Recall that, for x : A ` p : 2 and Γ ` t : A, we define Γ ` assertλxp(t) def= B1(instrλxp(t)) :
A+ 1.
This operation assert forms a bijection between:
the terms p such that x : A ` p : 2 (the predicates on A); and
the terms t such that x : A ` t ≤ return x : A+ 1
This is proven by the following result.
I Lemma 21. If x : A ` p : 1 + 1 and Γ ` t : A, then
1. Γ ` assertλxp(t) : A+ 1
2. Γ ` assertλxp(t) ≤ inl (t) : A+ 1.
3. (assert↓) Γ ` assertλxp(t)↓= [t/x]p : 2
4. If x : A ` t ≤ inl (x) : A+ 1 then x : A ` t = assertλx(t↓)(x) : A+ 1.
Proof. 1. An easy application of the rules (instr) , (case) , (inl) , (inr) and (unit) .
2. The term inl (instrλxp(t)) is a bound for this inequality.
3.
assertλxp(t)↓ def= B1(instrλxp(t))↓= inl? (instrλxp(t))
= p[x := t] by (instr-test)
4. Let b be a bound for the inequality t ≤ inl (x), so (b = B1) = t and do x ←
b; return ∇(x) = inl (x). Then
b↓= (do x← b; return ∇(x))↓= inl (x)↓= >.
Hence we can define c = left (b). We therefore have B1(c) = t and ∇(c) = x. Now, the
rule (ηinstr) gives us
c = instrλxinl?(c)(x) = instrλxt↓(x)
∴ t = B1(c) = assertλxt↓(x)
J
We now give rules for calculating instrλxp and assertλxp directed by the type.
I Lemma 22 ((assert-scalar)). If ` s : 2 then
` assertλ_s(∗) = instrλ_s(∗) = s : 2
Proof. We have ∇(s) = ∗ by (η1) and s↓= s by (η+) . The result follows by (ηinstr) . J
I Lemma 23 ((instr+),(assert+)). If x : A+B ` p : 2 and Γ ` t : A+B then
Γ ` instrλxp(t) = case t of inl (y) 7→ (inl + inl)(instrλa.p[x:=inl(a)](y)) |
inr (z) 7→ (inr + inr)(instrλb.p[x:=inr(b)](z))
Γ ` assertλxp(t) = case t of inl (y) 7→ do w ← assertλa.p[x:=inl(a)](y); return inl (w) |
inr (z) 7→ do w ← assertλb.p[x:=inr(b)](z); return inr (w)
where (inl + inl)(t) def= case t of inl (x) 7→ inl (x) | inr (y) 7→ inl (y), and (inr + inr)(t) is defined
similarly.
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Proof. For x : A+B, let us write f(x) for
f(x) def= case x of inl (y) 7→ (inl + inl)(instrλa.p[inl(a)](y)) |
inr (z) 7→ (inr + inr)(instrλb.p[inr(b)](z))
We shall prove f(x) = instrλxp(x).
We have
∇(f(x)) = case x of inl (y) 7→ inl (∇(assertλa.p[x:=inl(a)](y))) |
inr (z) 7→ inr (∇(assertλb.p[inr(b)](z)))
= case x of inl (y) 7→ inl (y) | inr (z) 7→ inr (z)
= x by (η+)
f(x)↓ = case x of inl (y) 7→ instrλa.p[x:=inl(a)](y)↓ | inr (z) 7→ instrλb.p[inr(b)](z)
= case x of inl (y) 7→ p[x := inl (y)] | inr (z) 7→ p[x := inr (z)]
= p by Corollary 5.2
Hence f(x) = instrp(x) by (ηinstr) . J
I Corollary 24 ((instr m),(assert m)). 1. Given x : m ` t : n and Γ ` s : m,
instrλxt(s) = case mi=1 s of i 7→ case nj=1 t[x := i] of j 7→ innj (i) .
2. Given x : n ` p : 2 and Γ ` t : n,
assertp(t) = case ni=1t of i 7→ if p[x := i] then return i else fail .
4.6 Sequential Product
We do not have conjunction or disjunction in our language for predicates over the same type,
as this would involve duplicating variables. However, we do have the following sequential
product. (This was called the ‘and-then’ test operator in Section 9 in [10].)
Let x : A ` p, q : 2. We define the sequential product p & q by
x : A ` p & q def= do x← assertλxp(x); q : 2 .
I Proposition 25. Let x : A ` p, q : 2.
1. instrp&q(x) = case instrp(x) of inl (x) 7→ instrq(x) | inr (y) 7→ inr (y)
2. assertp&q(x) = do x← assertp(x); assertq(x) def= assertp(x)= assertq
3. (Commutativity) p & q = q & p.
4. (p> q) & r = p & r > q & r and p & (q > r) = p & q > p & r.
5. p & ⊥ = ⊥ & q = ⊥
6. p & > = p and > & q = q
7. p & (q & r) = (p & q) & r
8. Let x : A ` p : 2. If x does not occur in q, then p & q = case p of inl (_) 7→ q | inr (_) 7→ ⊥.
Proof. 1. We have
inl? (case instrp(x) of inl (x) 7→ instrq(x) | inr (y) 7→ inr (y))
= case instrp(x) of inl (x) 7→ q | inr (y) 7→ ⊥
= do x← assertp(x); q = p & q
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and
∇(case instrp(x) of inl (x) 7→ instrq(x) | inr (y) 7→ inr (y))
= case instrp(x) of inl (x) 7→ x | inr (y) 7→ y
= ∇(instrp(x)) = x
so the result follows by (ηinstr) .
2. This follows immediately from the previous part.
3. This follows from the previous part and the rule (comm) (Appendix A.9).
4. p & (q> r) = (p & q)> (p & r) by Corollary 17. The other case follows by Commutativity.
5. ⊥ & p = ⊥ by Lemma 6.
6. > & q = q by Lemma 6.
7. (p & q) & r def= do x← assertp&q(x); r
= do x← (assertp(x)= assertq); r by part 2
= do x← assertp(x); do x← assertq(x); r by Lemma 6
def= p & (q & r)
8. p & q = do _ ← assertp(x); q = case assertp(x) of inl (_) 7→ q | inr (_) 7→ ⊥ =
case (assertp(x))↓ of inl (_) 7→ q | inr (_) 7→ ⊥ = if p then q else ⊥.
9. Let b : 3 be given by
b
def= if p then if q then 1 else 3 else if r then 2 else 3
Then
b= B1 = if p then if q then > else ⊥ else if r then ⊥ else ⊥
= if p then q else ⊥ = p & q
b= B2 = if p then ⊥ else r similarly
= if p⊥ then r else ⊥ = p⊥ & r
Thus, b is a bound for p & q > p⊥ & r. We also have
do x← b; return ∇(x) def= if p then if q then > else ⊥ else if r then > else ⊥
= if p then q else r
and the result is proved.
J
These results show that the scalars form an effect monoid, and the predicates on any
type form an effect module over that effect monoid (see [10] Lemma 13 and Proposition 14).
4.7 n-tests
Recall that an n-test on a type A is an n-tuple (p1, . . . , pn) such that
x : A ` p1 > · · ·> pn = > : 2
The following lemma shows that there is a one-to-one correspondance between the n-tests
on A, and the maps A→ n.
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I Lemma 26. For every n-test (p1, . . . , pn) on A, there exists a term x : A ` t(x) : n, unique
up to equality, such that
x : A ` pi(x) = Bi(t(x)) : 2
Proof. The proof is by induction on n. The case n = 1 is trivial.
Suppose the result is true for n. Take an n+ 1-test (p1, . . . , pn+1). Then
(p1, p2, . . . , pn > pn+1) is an n-test. By the induction hypothesis, there exists t : n such that
Bi(t) = pi (i < n), Bn(t) = pn > pn+1 .
Let b : 3 be the bound for pn > pn+1, so
B1(b) = pn, B2(b) = pn+1, B12(b) = pn > pn+1 .
Reading t and b as partial functions in n− 1+ 1 and 2+ 1, we have that t↑= b↓= pn> pn+1.
Hence «b, t» : 2+ n− 1 exists. Reading it as a term of type n+ 1, we have that
B1(«b, t») = pn, B2(«b, t») = pn+1, Bi+2(«b, t») = pi (i < n) .
From this it is easy to construct the term of type n+ 1 required. J
We write instr(p1,...,pn)(s) for instrt(s), where t is the term such that Bi(t) = pi for each i.
We therefore have
I Lemma 27. instr(p1,...,pn)(x) is the unique term such that ini?
(
instr(p1,...,pn)(x)
)
= pi for
all i and ∇(instr(p1,...,pn)(x)) = x.
Proof. Let t : n be the term such that Bi(t) = pi for all i. By the rules for instruments,
instr(p1,...,pn)(x) is the unique term such that
(case ni=1instr(p1,...,pn)(x) of inni (()_) 7→ i) = t
∇(instr(p1,...,pn)(x)) = x
It is therefore sufficient to prove that, given terms Γ ` s, t : n,
Γ ` s = t : n⇔ ∀i.Γ ` Bi(s) = Bi(t) : 2
This fact is proven by induction on n, with the case n = 2 holding by the rules (βinlr1) ,
(βinlr1) and (ηinlr) . J
I Lemma 28.
instrpi(x) = case nj=1instr(p1,...,pn)(x) of innj (x) 7→
{
inl (x) if i = j
inr (x) if i 6= j
assertpi(x) = case nj=1instr(p1,...,pn)(x) of innj (x) 7→
{
return x if i = j
fail if i 6= j
Proof. The first formula holds because inl? () maps the right-hand side to ini?
(
instr(p1,...,pn)(x)
)
=
pi, and ∇ mapst the right-hand side to x. The second formula follows immediately from the
first. J
I Lemma 29.
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If (p, q) is a 2-test, then q = p⊥, and instr(p,q)(t) = instrp(t).
Proof. If (p, q) is a 2-test then p > q = > and so q = p⊥ by Proposition 14.4. Then
instr(p,q)(t) = instrp(t) by (ηinstr) , since inl?
(
instr(p,q)(x)
)
= 〈p?〉> > 〈q?〉⊥ = p and
∇(instr(p,q)(x)) = x. J
We can now define the program that divides into n branches depending on the outcome
of an n-test:
I Definition 30. Given x : A ` p1(x)> · · ·> pn(x) = > : 2, define
x : A ` measure p1(x) 7→ t1(x) | · · · | pn(x) 7→ tn(x)
def= case instr(p1,...,pn)(x) of in 1(x) 7→ t1(x) | · · · | in n(x) 7→ tn(x)
I Lemma 31. The measure construction satisfies the following laws.
1. (measure > 7→ t) = t
2. (measure p1 7→ t1 | · · · | pn 7→ tn | ⊥ 7→ tn+1) = (measure p1 7→ t1 | · · · | pn 7→ tn)
3. (measurei pi 7→ measurej qij 7→ tij) = (measurei,j pi & qij 7→ tij)
4. For any permutation pi of {1, . . . , n}, measurei pi 7→ ti = measurei ppi(i) 7→ tpi(i).
5. If tn = tn+1 then
measureni=1pi 7→ ti = measure p1 7→ t1 | · · · | pn−1 7→ tn−1 | pn > pn+1 7→ tn.
Proof. 1. measure> 7→ t(x) def= case instr(>)(x) of in11 (x) 7→ t(x)
= t(instr(>)(x))
.
So it suffices to prove instr(>)(s) = s. This holds by the uniqueness of Lemma 27, since
we have in1? (x) = > and ∇(x) = x.
2. It suffices to prove instr(p1,...,pn,⊥)(x) = case ni=1instr(p1,...,pn)(x) of inni (x) 7→ inn+1i (x).
Let R denote the right-hand side. Then
ini? (R) = ini?
(
instr(p1,...,pn)(x)
)
= pi
∇(R) = case ni=1instr(p1,...,pn)(x) of inni (x) 7→ x
= ∇(instr(p1,...,pn)(x)) = x
3. Let us write ini,j () (1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ ni) for the constructors of (n1 + · · ·+ nm) · A,
and ini,j? () for the corresponding predicates.
It suffices to prove that
instr(pi&qij)i,j (x) = case mi=1 instr~p(x) of inmi (x) 7→ case n1j=1 instr~qi(x) of innij (x) 7→ ini,j (x) .
Let R denote the right-hand side. We have
ini,j? (R) = case mi′=1 instr~p(x) of inmi′ (x) 7→
{
inj? (instr~qi(x)) if i = i′
⊥ if i 6= ß′
= case mi′=1 instr~p(x) of inmi′ (x) 7→
{
qij if i = i′
⊥ if i 6= i′
= do x←
(
case mi′=1 instr~p(x) of inmi′ (x) 7→
{
return x if i = i′
fail if i 6= i′
)
; qij
= do x← assertpi(x); qij
(by Lemma 28)
= pi & qij
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and
∇(R) = case mi=1 instr~p(x) of inmi (x) 7→ ∇(instr~qi(x))
= case mi=1 instr~p(x) of inmi (x) 7→ x = ∇(instr~p(x)) = x
4. It is sufficient to prove that
instr(p1,...,pn)(x) = case ni=1instr(ppi(1),...,ppi(n))(x) of inni (x) 7→ innpi−1(i) (x) .
Let R denote the right-hand side. We have
ini? (R) = inpi−1(i)?
(
instr(ppi(1),...,ppi(n))(x)
)
= pi
∇(R) = ∇(instr(ppi(1),...,ppi(n))(x)) = x
5. It suffices to prove instr(p1,...,pn−1,pn>pn+1) = case n+1i=1 instr~p(x) of inni (x) 7→
{
inni (x) if i < n
inni (x) if i ≥ n
.
Let R denote the right-hand side. We have, for i < n:
ini? (R) = ini? (instr~p(x)) = piinn? (R) = Bn,n+1(index (instr~p(x)))
= inn? (instr~p(x))> inn+1? (instr~p(x)) = pn > pn+1∇(R) = x .
J
Let x : A ` p : 2 and Γ, x : A ` s, t : B. We define
if p then s else t def= measure p 7→ s | p⊥ 7→ t : B .
I Lemma 32. 1. If x : A ` p1 > · · ·> pn = > : 2 and x : A ` q1, . . . , qn : 2, then
(measure p1 7→ q1 | · · · | pn 7→ qn) = p1 & q1 > · · ·> pn & qn .
2. Let x : A ` p : 2 and Γ ` q, r : B where x /∈ Γ. Then if p then q else r = case p of inl (_) 7→
q | inr (_) 7→ r : B.
3. Let x : A ` p : 2. Then x : A ` if p then > else ⊥ = p : 2.
Proof. 1. Immediate from Lemma 27.
2. We have
measure p 7→ q | p⊥ 7→ r def= case instrλxp(x) of inl (_) 7→ q | inr (_) 7→ r
= case inl? (instrλxp(x)) of inl (_) 7→ q | inr (_) 7→ r
= case p of inl (_) 7→ q | inr (_) 7→ r
3. if p then > else ⊥ = case p of inl (_) 7→ > | inr (_) 7→ ⊥ = p by (η+) .
J
4.8 Scalars
From the rules given in Figure 3, the usual algebra of the rational interval from 0 to 1 follows.
I Lemma 33. If p/q = m/n as rational numbers, then ` p · (1/q) = m · (1/n) : 2.
Proof. We first prove that ` a·(1/ab) = 1/b : 2 for all a, b. This holds because ab·(1/ab) = >
by (n · 1/n) , hence a · (1/ab) = 1/b by (divide) .
Hence we have p · (1/q) = pn · (1/nq) = qm · (1/nq) = m · (1/n). J
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Recall that within COMET, we are writing m/n for the term m · (1/n).
I Lemma 34. Let q and r be rational numbers in [0, 1].
1. If q ≤ r in the usual ordering, then ` q ≤ r : 2.
2. ` q > r : 2 iff q + r ≤ 1, in which case Γ ` q > r = q + r : 2.
3. ` q & r = qr : 2.
Proof. By the previous lemma, we may assume q and r have the same denominator. Let
q = a/n and r = b/n.
1. We have a ≤ b, hence ` a · (1/n) ≤ b · (1/n) : 2 by Lemma 10.1.
2. If q + r ≤ 1 then ` a · (1/n)> b · (1/n) = (a+ b) · (1/n) : 2 by Associativity.
For the converse, suppose ` q>r : 2, so ` (a+b)·(1/n) : 2, and suppose for a contradiction
q + r > 1. Then we have
` >> (a+ b− n) · (1/n) : 2
and so ` (1/n) = 0 : 2 by the Zero-One Law, hence ` > = n · (1/n) = n · 0 = ⊥ : 2. This
contradicts Corollary 41.
3. We first prove (1/a) & (1/b) = 1/ab : 2. This holds because ab · (1/a) & (1/b) =
(a · (1/a)) & (b · (1/b)) = > & > = >.
Now we have, (m/n) & (p/q) = mp · ((1/n) & (1/q)) = mp · (1/nq) as required.
J
4.9 Normalisation
The following lemma gives us a rule that allows us to calculate the normalised form of a
substate in many cases, including the examples in Section 3.
I Lemma 35. Let ` t : A + 1, ` p1 > · · · > pn = > : 2, and ` q : 2. Let ` s1, . . . , sn : A.
Suppose ` 1/m ≤ q : 2. If
` t = measure p1 & q 7→ return s1 | · · · | pn & q 7→ return sn | q⊥ 7→ fail : A+ 1
then
` nrm (t) = measure p1 7→ s1 | · · · | pn 7→ sn : A
Proof. Let ρ def= measureni=1pi 7→ si. By the rule (ηnrm) , it is sufficient to prove that
t = do _← t; return ρ. We have
do _← t; return ρ = measure p1 & q 7→ return ρ | · · · | pn & q 7→ return ρ | q⊥ 7→ fail
= measure (p1 > · · ·> pn) & q 7→ return ρ | q⊥ 7→ fail
= measure q 7→ return ρ | q⊥ 7→ fail
= measure q 7→ measureni=1pi 7→ return si | q⊥ 7→ fail
= measureni=1 q & pi 7→ return si | q⊥ 7→ fail
= t
(We used the commutativity of & in the last step.) J
I Corollary 36. Let α1, . . . , αn, β be rational numbers that sum to 1, with β 6= 1. If
` t = measure α1 7→ return s1 | · · · | αn 7→ return sn | β 7→ fail : A+ 1
then
` nrm (t) = measure α1/(α1 + · · ·+ αn) 7→ s1 | · · · | αn/(α1 + · · ·+ αn) 7→ sn : A
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5 Semantics
The terms of COMET are intended to represent probabilistic programs. We show how to
give semantics to our system in three different ways: using discrete and continuous probability
distributions, and simple set-theoretic semantics for deterministic computation.
5.1 Discrete Probabilistic Computation
We give an interpretation that assigns, to each term, a discrete probability distribution over
its output type.
I Definition 37. Let A be a set.
The support of a function φ : A→ [0, 1] is suppφ = {a ∈ A : φ(a) 6= 0}.
A (discrete) probability distribution over A is a function φ : A→ φ with finite support
such that
∑
a∈A φ(a) = 1.
Let DA be the set of all probability distributions on A.
We shall interpret every type A as a set [[A]]. Assume we are given a set [[C]] for each
type constant C. Define a set [[A]] for each type A thus:
[[0]] = ∅ [[1]] = {∗} [[A+B]] = [[A]] unionmulti [[B]] [[A ⊗ B]] = [[A]]× [[B]]
where A unionmulti B = {a1 : a ∈ A} ∪ {b2 : b ∈ B}. We extend this to contexts by defining
[[x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An]] = [[A1]]× · · · × [[An]].
Now, to every term x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An ` t : B, we assign a function [[t]] : [[A1]]× · · · ×
[[An]]→ D [[B]]. The value [[t]] (a1, . . . , an)(b) ∈ [0, 1] will be written as P (t(a1, . . . , an) = b),
and should be thought of as the probability that b will be the output if a1, . . . , an are the
inputs.
The sums involved here are all well-defined because, for all t and ~g, the function P (t(~g) =
−) has finite support.
I Lemma 38. Let Γ ` s : A and ∆, x : A ` t : B, so that Γ,∆ ` t[x := s] : B. Then
P (t[x := s](~g, ~d) = b) =
∑
a∈[[A]]
P (s(~g) = a)P (t(~d, a) = b)
Proof. The proof is by induction on t. We do here the case where t ≡ x:
P (x[x := s](~g) = b) = P (s(~g) = b)
and∑
a
P (s(~g) = a)P (x(a) = b) = P (s(~g) = b)
since P (x(a) = b) is 0 if a 6= b and 1 if a = b. J
I Theorem 39 (Soundness). 1. If Γ ` t : A is derivable, then for all ~g ∈ [[Γ]], we have
P (t(~g) = −) is a probability distribution on [[A]].
2. If Γ ` s = t : A, then P (s(~g) = a) = P (t(~g) = a).
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P (xi(~a) = b) =
{
1 if b = ai
0 if b 6= ai
P (∗(~a) = ∗) = 1
P ((s ⊗ t)(~g, ~d) = (a, b))
= P (s(~g) = a)P (t(~d) = b)
P (( ¡ t)(~g) = a) = 0
P (inl (t) (~g) = a1) = P (t(~g) = a)
P (inl (t) (~g) = b2) = 0
P (inr (t) (~g) = a1) = 0
P (inr (t) (~g) = b2) = P (t(~g) = b)
P («s, t»(~g) = a1) = P (s(~g) = a1)
P («s, t»(~g) = b2) = P (t(~g) = b1)
P (left (t) (~g) = a) = P (t(~g) = a1)
P (instrλxt(s)(~g) = ai)
= P (s(~g) = a)P (t(a) = i)
P (1/n(~g) = >) = 1/n
P (1/n(~g) = ⊥) = (n− 1)/n
P (nrm (t) (~g) = a)
= P (t(~g) = a1)/(1− P (t(~g) = ∗2))
P ((s> t)(~g) = a1)
= P (s(~g) = a1) + P (t(~g) = a1)
P ((s> t)(~g) = ∗2)
= P (s(~g) = ∗2) + P (t(~g) = ∗2)− 1
P ((let x ⊗ y = s in t)(~g, ~d) = c) =
∑
a
∑
b
P (s(~g) = (a, b))P (t(~d, a, b) = c)
P (case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ t(~g, ~d) = c)
=
∑
a
P (r(~g) = a1)P (s(~d, a) = c) +
∑
b
P (r(~g) = b2)P (t(~d, b) = c)
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Proof. The proof is by induction on derivations. We do here the case of the rule (instr-test)
:
P ((case i instrλxt(s) of inni (_) 7→ i)(~g) = i)
=
n∑
j=1
∑
a∈[[A]]
P (instrλxt(s)(~g) = aj)P (inni (∗) () = ∗j)
=
∑
a∈[[A]]
P (instrλxt(s)(~g) = ai)
=
∑
a∈[[A]]
P (s(~g) = a)P (t(a) = i)
= P (t[x := s](~g) = i)
by the lemma. J
I Corollary 40. If Γ ` s ≤ t : A+ 1 then P (s(~g) = a) ≤ P (t(~g) = a) for all ~g, a.
As a corollary, we know that COMET is non-degenerate:
I Corollary 41. Not every judgement is derivable; in particular, the judgement ` > = ⊥ : 2
is not derivable.
With these definitions, we can calculate the semantics of each of our defined constructions.
For example, the semantics of assert are given by
P (assertλxp(t)(~g) = a1) = P (t(~g) = a)P (p(a) = >)
P (assertλxp(t)(~g) = ∗2) =
∑
a
P (t(~g) = a)P (p(a) = ⊥)
5.2 Alternative Semantics
It is also possible to give semantics to COMET using continuous probabilities. We assign
a measurable space [[A]] to every type A. Each term then gives a measurable function
[[A1]]× · · · × [[An]]→ G [[B]], where GX is the space of all probability distributions over the
measurable space X. (G here is the Giry monad [7].)
If we remove the constants 1/n from the system, we can give deterministic semantics to
the subsystem, in which we assign a set to every type, and a function [[A1]]×· · ·× [[An]]→ [[B]].
More generally, we can give an interpretation of COMET in any commutative monoidal
effectus with normalisation in which there exists a scalar s such that n · s = 1 for all positive
integers n [6]. The discrete and continuous semantics we have described are two instances of
this interpretation.
6 Conclusion
The system COMET allows for the specification of probabilistic programs and reasoning
about their properties, both within the same syntax.
There are several avenues for further work and research.
The type theory that we describe can be interpreted both in discrete and in continuous
probabilistic models, that is, both in the Kleisli category K`(D) of the distribution
monad D and in the Kleisli category K`(G) of the Giry monad G. On a finite type each
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distribution is discrete. The discrete semantics were exploited in the current paper in
the examples in Section 3. In a follow-up version we intend to elaborate also continuous
examples.
The normalisation and conditioning that we use in this paper can in principle also be
used in a quantum context, using the appropriate (non-side-effect free) assert maps that
one has there. This will give a form of Bayesian quantum theory, as also explored in [14].
A further ambitious follow-up project is to develop tool support for COMET, so that
the computations that we carry out here by hand can be automated. This will provide a
formal language for Bayesian inference.
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A Formal Presentation of COMET
The full set of rules of deduction for COMET are given below.
A.1 Structural Rules
Γ, x : A, y : B,∆ ` J(exch) Γ, y : B, x : A,∆ ` J
x : A ∈ Γ(var) Γ ` x : A
The exchange rule says that the order of the variables in the context does not matter.
This holds for all types of judgements J on the right hand side of the turnstile. The weakening
rule is admissible (see Lemma 3.1), and says that one may add (unused) assumptions to the
context.
However, we do not have the contraction rule in our type theory. In particular, the
judgement x : A ` x ⊗ x : A ⊗ A is not derivable. Thus, in our probabilistic settings,
information may be discarded, but cannot be duplicated.
Γ ` t : A(ref) Γ ` t = t : A
Γ ` s = t : A(sym) Γ ` t = s : A
Γ ` r = s : A Γ ` s = t : A(trans) Γ ` r = t : A
These rules simply ensure that the judgement equality is an equivalence relation.
A.2 The Singleton Type
(unit) Γ ` ∗ : 1 Γ ` t : 1(η1) Γ ` t = ∗ : 1
These ensure that the type 1 is a type with only one object up to equality.
A.3 Tensor Product
Γ ` s : A ∆ ` t : B(⊗) Γ,∆ ` s ⊗ t : A⊗B
Γ ` s : A⊗B ∆, x : A, y : B ` t : C(lett) Γ,∆ ` let x ⊗ y = s in t : C
Γ ` s = s′ : A ∆ ` t = t′ : B(paireq)
Γ,∆ ` s ⊗ t = s′ ⊗ t′ : A⊗B
Γ ` s = s′ : A⊗B ∆, x : A, y : B ` t = t′ : C(leteq)
Γ,∆ ` (let x ⊗ y = s in t) = (let x ⊗ y = s′ in t′) : C
Notice that in rule (⊗) the contexts Γ and ∆ of the two terms s, t are put together in
the conclusion. Thus, the tensor s ⊗ t on terms is a form of parallel composition. This is a
so-called introduction rule for the tensor type, since it tells us how to produce terms in a
tensor type A⊗B on the right hand side of the turnstile `. The rule (lett) is an elimination
rule since it tells us how to use terms of tensor type.
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Γ ` r : A ∆ ` s : B Θ, x : A, y : B ` t : C(β⊗)
Γ,∆,Θ ` (let x ⊗ y = r ⊗ s in t) = t[x := r, y := s] : C
Γ ` t : A⊗B(η⊗)
Γ ` t = (let x ⊗ y = t in x ⊗ y) : A⊗B
Rule (β⊗) tells how a let term should decompose a term r ⊗ s, namely by simultaneously
substituting r for x and s for y in as described in the term t[x := r, y := s]. Rule (η⊗) is its
dual, and says that decomposing an object then immediately recomposing it does nothing.
Γ ` r : A⊗B ∆, x : A, y : B ` s : C ⊗D Θ, z : C,w : D ` t : E(let-let)
Γ,∆,Θ ` let x ⊗ y = r in (let z ⊗ w = s in t)
= let z ⊗ w = (let x ⊗ y = r in s) in t : E
Γ ` r : A⊗B ∆, x : A, y : B ` s : C Θ ` t : D(let-⊗)
Γ,∆,Θ ` let x ⊗ y = r in (s ⊗ t) = (let x ⊗ y = r in s) ⊗ t : D
Our final set of rules are so-called commuting conversion rules described above. They regulate
the proper interaction between the term constructs let, case and ⊗. It looks like several
interactions are missing here (a let on the right of a tensor, a let inside a case , etc.), but in
fact, the rules for all the other cases can be derived from these four, as we show in Lemma
4.1.
A.4 Empty Type
Γ ` t : 0(magic) Γ ` ¡ t : A
Γ ` s : 0 Γ ` t : A(η0) Γ ` ¡ s = t : A
The rule (magic) says that from an inhabitant M : 0 we can produce an inhabitant ¡M
in any type A. Intuitively, this says ‘If the empty type is inhabited, then every type is
inhabited’, which is vacuously true. And (η0) says that vacuously, if the empty type 0 is
inhabited, then all terms of any type are equal.
A.5 Binary Coproducts
Γ ` t : A(inl)
Γ ` inl (t) : A+B
Γ ` t : B(inr)
Γ ` inr (t) : A+B
Γ ` t = t′ : A(inl-eq)
Γ ` inl (t) = inl (t′) : A+B
Γ ` t = t′ : B(inr-eq)
Γ ` inr (t) = inr (t′) : A+B
Γ ` r : A+B ∆, x : A ` s : C ∆, y : B ` t : C(case)
Γ,∆ ` case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ t : C
Γ ` r = r′ : A+B ∆, x : A ` s = s′ : C ∆, y : B ` t = t′ : C(case-eq)
Γ,∆ ` case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ t = case r′ of inl (x) 7→ s′ | inr (y) 7→ t′ : C
For the coproduct type A + B we have two introduction rules (inl) and (inr) which
produce terms inl (s) , inr (t) : A+B, coming from s : A and t : B. These operations inl (−)
and inr (−) are often called coprojections or injections.
The associated elimination rule (case) produces a term that uses a term r : A + B by
distinguishing whether or not r is of the form inl (−) or inr (−). In the first case the outcome
of r is used in term s, and in the second case in term t.
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Γ ` r : A ∆, x : A ` s : C ∆, y : B ` t : C(β+1) Γ,∆ ` case inl (r) of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ t = s[x := r] : C
Γ ` r : B ∆, x : A ` s : C ∆, y : B ` t : C(β+2) Γ,∆ ` case inr (r) of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ t = t[y := r] : C
Γ ` t : A+B(η+)
Γ ` t = case t of inl (x) 7→ inl (x) | inr (y) 7→ inr (y) : A+B
There are two β-conversions (β+1) and (β+2) for the coproduct type, describing how a
case term should handle a term of form inl (r) or inr (r). Again this this done via the expected
substitution, using the appropriate variable (x or y).
In rule (η+) , if the decomposition of t into inl (−) and inr (−) is then immediately
reconstituted, then the input is unchanged.
Γ ` r : A+B ∆, x : A ` s : C +D ∆, y : B ` s′ : C +D
Θ, z : C ` t : E Θ, w : D ` t′ : E
(case-case)
Γ,∆,Θ ` case r of inl (x) 7→ case s of inl (z) 7→ t | inr (w) 7→ t′ |
inr (y) 7→ case s′ of inl (z) 7→ t | inr (w) 7→ t′
= case (case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ s′)
of inl (z) 7→ t | inr (w) 7→ t′ : E
Γ ` r : A+B ∆, x : A ` s : C ∆, y : A ` s′ : C Θ ` t : D(case-⊗)
Γ,∆,Θ ` (case r of inl (x) 7→ s | inr (y) 7→ s′) ⊗ t =
case r of inl (x) 7→ s ⊗ t | inr (y) 7→ s′ ⊗ t : D
Γ ` r : A+B ∆, z : A ` s : C ⊗D
∆, w : B ` s′ : C ⊗D Θ, x : C, y : D ` t : E
(let-case)
Γ,∆,Θ ` let x ⊗ y = case r of inl (z) 7→ s | inr (w) 7→ s′ in t =
case r of inl (z) 7→ let x ⊗ y = s in t | inr (w) 7→ let x ⊗ y = s′ in t : E
These rules for commuting conversions show how the eliminators for ⊗ and + interact. Again,
the other cases can be derived from the primitive rules given here (Lemma 4).
A.6 Partial Pairing
We now come to the constructions that are new to our type theory. These possess a feature
that is unique to this type theory: we allow typing judgements (of the form t : A) to depend
on equality judgements (of the form s = t : A).
Γ ` s : A+ 1 Γ ` t : B + 1 Γ ` s ↓= t ↑: 2(inlr) Γ ` «s, t» : A+B
Γ ` s = s′ : A+ 1 Γ ` t = t′ : B + 1 Γ ` s ↓= t ↑: 2(inlr-eq)
Γ ` «s, t» = «s′, t′» : A+B
The term «s, t» can be understood in this way. Consider a term Γ ` t : A+ 1 as a partial
computation: it may output a value of type A, or it may diverge (if it reduces to inr (∗).) If
the judgement s ↓= t ↑ holds, then we know that exactly one of the computations s and t
will terminate on any input. The term «s, t» intuitively denotes the following computation:
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given an input, decide which of s or t will terminate. If s will terminate, run s; otherwise,
run t.
We have the following β- and η-rules for the inlr construction:
Γ ` s : A+ 1 Γ ` t : B + 1 Γ ` s ↓= t ↑: 2(βinlr1) Γ ` B1(«s, t») = s : A+ 1
Γ ` s : A+ 1 Γ ` t : B + 1 Γ ` s ↓= t ↑: 2(βinlr1) Γ ` B2(«s, t») = t : B + 1
Γ ` t : A+B(ηinlr)
Γ ` t = «B1(t),B2(t)» : A+B
A.7 The left () Construction
Γ ` t : A+B Γ ` inl? (t) = > : 2
(left)
Γ ` left (t) : A
Γ ` t = t′ : A+B Γ ` inl? (t) = > : 2
(left-eq)
Γ ` left (t) = left (t′) : A
The term left (t) should be understood as follows: if we have a term t : A + B and a
‘proof’ that t = inl (s) for some term s : A, then left (t) is that term s. The computation rules
for this construction are:
Γ ` t : A+B Γ ` inl? (t) = > : 2
(βleft)
Γ ` inl (left (t)) = t : A+B
Γ ` t : A(ηleft)
Γ ` left (inl (t)) = t : A
A.8 Joint Monicity Condition
We need the following rule for technical reasons. It corresponds to the condition that the
two maps B! and B2 from A+A to A are jointly monic in the partial form of the effectus
(see [10] Assumption 1 or [6] Lemma 49.4).
Γ ` s : (A+A) + 1 Γ ` t : (A+A) + 1
Γ ` s= B1 = t= B1 : A+ 1 Γ ` s= B2 = t= B2 : A+ 1
(JM)
Γ ` s = t : (A+A) + 1
It is used in the proof of the associativity of > (Lemma 10.3).
A.9 Instruments
The instrument map instrλxt(s) should be understood as follows: it denotes the value inni (s)
if t[x := s] returns the value i : n.
If we were allowed to simply duplicate data, we could have defined TODOxpt to be
case [t/x]p of inl (_) 7→ inl (t) | inr (_) 7→ inr (t). This cannot be done in our system, as it
would involve duplicating the variables in t.
The computation rules for this construction are as follows.
x : A ` t : n Γ ` s : A(instr)
Γ ` instrλxt(s) : n ·A
x : A ` t : n Γ ` s : A(∇-instr)
Γ ` ∇(instrλxt(s)) = s : A
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x : A ` t : n Γ ` s : A(instr-test)
Γ ` case ni=1instrλxt(s) of inni (_) 7→ i = t[x := s] : n
x : A ` r : n ·A x : A ` ∇(r) = x : A Γ ` s : A
(ηinstr)
Γ ` instrλx.case n
i=1r of inni (_)7→i(s) = r[x := s] : n ·A
x : A ` t = t′ : n Γ ` s = s′ : A(instr-eq)
Γ ` instrλxt(s) = instrλxt′(s′) : n ·A
We also introduce the following rule, which ensures that the sequential product & is
commutative.
x : A ` p : 2 x : A ` q : 2 Γ ` t : A(comm)
Γ ` assertλxp(t)= assertλxq = assertλxq(t)= assertλxp : A+ 1
A.10 Scalar Constants
For any natural number n ≥ 2, we have the following rules.
(1/n)
Γ ` 1/n : 2 (n · 1/n) Γ ` n · 1/n = > : 2
Γ ` n · t = > : 2(divide)
Γ ` t = 1/n : 2
(bmn) (1 ≤ m < n)Γ ` bmn : 3
(B1 − bmn) (1 ≤ m < n)Γ ` do x← bmn;B1(x) = m · 1/n : 2
(B2 − bmn) (1 ≤ m < n)Γ ` do x← bmn; return ∇(x) = 1/n : 2
These ensure that 1/n is the unique scalar whose sum with itself n times is >. The term
bmn is required to ensure that the term 1/n> · · ·> 1/n is well-typed.
A.11 Normalisation
Finally, we have these rules for normalisation.
` t : A+ 1 ` 1/n ≤ t : 2
(nrm)
Γ ` nrm (t) : A
` t : A+ 1 ` 1/n ≤ t ↓: 2
(βnrm)
Γ ` t = do _← t; return nrm (t) : A+ 1
` t : A+ 1 ` 1/n ≤ t ↓: 2 ` ρ : A ` t = do _← t; return ρ : A+ 1
(ηnrm)
Γ ` ρ = nrm (t) : A
These ensure that, if t is a non-zero state in A+ 1, then ρ is the unique state in A such
that t = do _← t; return ρ.
B Proof of Associativity
I Theorem 42. If Γ ` (r > s)> t : A+ 1, then Γ ` r > (s> t) : A+ 1 and Γ ` r > (s> t) =
(r > s)> t : A+ 1.
(Note: this proof follows the proofs that > is associative in an effectus, found in [10]
Proposition 12 or [6] Proposition 13.)
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Proof. Let b be a bound for r > s and c a bound for (r > s)> t, so that
b= B1 = r (1)
b= B2 = s (2)
do x← b; return ∇(x) = r > s (3)
c= B1 = r > s (4)
c= B2 = t (5)
do x← c; return ∇(x) = (r > s)> t (6)
Define d : (A+ 1) + 1 by
d = case c of inl (inl (_)) 7→ fail | inl (inr (x)) 7→ return inl (x) | inr (_) 7→ return inr (∗)
We wish to form the term «b, d». To do this, we must prove b↓= d↑. We do this by proving
both are equal to (r > s)↓.
We have
(r > s)↓ = (do x← b; return ∇(x))↓= do x← b; (return ∇(x))↓ = do x← b;> = b↓
and
(r > s)↓ = (do x← c;B1(x))↓= do x← c; (B1(x))↓ = do x← c; inl? (x)
d↑ = case c of inl (inl (_)) 7→ > | inl (inr (_)) 7→ ⊥ | inr (_) 7→ ⊥
= do x← c; inl? (y)
∴ b↓ = d↑
So, let e = «b, d» : (A+A) + (A+ 1). We claim
c = case e of inl (inl (a)) 7→ return inl (a) | inl (inr (a)) 7→ return inl (a) | (7)
inr (inl (a)) 7→ return inr (a) | inr (inr (_)) 7→ fail
We prove the claim using (JM) . Writing R for the right-hand side of (7), we have
(RHD = B1) = do x← B1(e); return ∇(x) = do x← b; return ∇(x) = r > s by (3)
(c= B1) = r > s by (4)
(R= B2) = (do x← B2(e);x) = (do x← d;x) = (c= B2)
and so (7) follows by (JM) .
Now that the claim (7) is proved, we return to the main proof. Define e′ : (A+A) + 1 by
e′ = case e of inl (inl (_)) 7→ fail | inl (inr (a)) 7→ return inl (a) |
inr (inl (a)) 7→ return inr (a) | inr (inr (_)) 7→ fail
We claim e′ is a bound for s> t. We have
(e′ = B1) = case e of inl (inl (_)) 7→ fail | inl (inr (a)) 7→ return a | inr (_) 7→ fail
= (B1(e)= B2) = (b= B2) = s by (2)
(e′ = B2) = case e of inl (_) 7→ fail | inr (inl (a)) 7→ return a | inr (inr (_)) 7→ fail
= (B2(e)= B1) = (d= B1)
= case c of inl (inl (_)) 7→ fail | inl (inr (x)) 7→ return x | inr (_) 7→ fail
= (c= B2) = t by (5)
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and so
s> t =do x← e′; return ∇(x) (8)
=case e of inl (inl (_)) 7→ fail | inl (inr (a)) 7→ return a |
inr (inl (a)) 7→ return a | inr (inr (_)) 7→ fail
(9)
Now, define e′′ : (A+A) + 1 by
e′′ = case e of inl (inl (a)) 7→ return inl (a) | inl (inr (a)) 7→ return inr (a)
inr (inl (a)) 7→ return inr (a) | inr (inr (_)) 7→ fail
We will prove that e′′ is a bound for r > (s> t). We have
(e′′ = B1) = case e of inl (inl (a)) 7→ return a
| inl (inr (_)) 7→ fail
| inr (inl (_)) 7→ fail
| inr (inr (_)) 7→ fail
= (B1(e)= B1) = (b= B1) = r by (1)
(e′′ = B2) = case e of inl (inl (_)) 7→ fail
| inl (inr (a)) 7→ return a
| inr (inl (a)) 7→ return a
| inr (inr (_)) 7→ fail
= s> t by (8)
do x← e′′; return ∇(x) = case e of in 1(a) 7→ return a
in 2(a) 7→ return a
in 3(a) 7→ return a
in 4(_) 7→ fail
= do x← case e of in 1(a) 7→ return inl (a)
in 2(a) 7→ return inl (a)
in 3(a) 7→ return inr (a)
in 4(a) 7→ fail; return ∇(x)
= do x← c; return ∇(x) by (7)
= (r > s)> t
Thus, r > (s> t) = do x← e′′; return ∇(x) = (r > s)> t. J
